In recent days, Liverpool’s head coach Arne Slot has embraced a full-throttle offensive strategy in a couple of the club’s recent losses, but it seems to be doing them more harm than good. This approach is quite the opposite of what has typically rendered them formidable.
Slot seemed a bit miffed during his first press conference as the Liverpool head coach when questioned about his team’s formation.
"I’d hope that when folks watch my team, they wouldn’t pigeonhole us into a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3 setup. I aim for a game that exudes freedom with the ball, allowing players to explore different positions," Slot articulated.
However, he remarked, "Had you asked me, I would have said we play a 4-3-3 rather than 4-2-3-1 at Feyenoord. I’m curious who convinced you it was a 4-2-3-1. Perhaps they need to revisit their coaching basics."
Yet, under Slot’s stewardship on Merseyside, Liverpool has bounced back and forth between the 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 formations in his inaugural season. Minor tweaks might be applied to certain roles, such as those of the center-forward or full-backs. The significant variation, though, is seen in his use of midfielders, fluctuating from two defensive midfielders and an attacking midfielder setup to one defensive midfielder with two central midfielders, and similar variations.
The Shift from Control to Chaos
The term "control" has been synonymous with Liverpool’s recent era, often giving the impression that Slot’s football philosophy may not possess the fireworks of his predecessor’s style. Regardless, this control has catapulted the team to the Premier League’s apex, boasting the best goal difference, not to mention significantly more victories than any rival and leaving relegated Southampton well in their wake.
Slot recently took a daring turn in tactics that could only be described as an experimental shift. He ramped up to an all-out attack stance in the second halves of both the Carabao Cup final against Newcastle and a Premier League meetup with Fulham.
In both encounters, Slot took full advantage of his substitution options, opting exclusively for offensive changes:
Subs against Newcastle: Nunez replaced Jota; Jones swapped in for Konate; Gakpo took Mac Allister’s spot; Chiesa switched with Gravenberch; Elliott in place of Diaz.
Subs against Fulham: Diaz for Gakpo; Elliott replaced Szoboszlai; Nunez took Jota’s place; Bradley switched with Konate; Chiesa for Robertson.
Both times, Slot ended up pulling Ibrahima Konate from the lineup. Against Newcastle, he also replaced midfielders Alexis Mac Allister and Ryan Gravenberch, and during the Fulham game, full-back Andy Robertson was subbed off as well.
As those matches closed, Liverpool’s setup, post the substitutions, was markedly different:
Against Newcastle: Kelleher; Quansah, Van Dijk, Robertson; Jones, Elliott, Szoboszlai; Salah, Chiesa, Nunez, Gakpo.
Against Fulham: Kelleher; Bradley, Van Dijk, Gravenberch; Mac Allister, Elliott, Jones; Salah, Chiesa, Nunez, Diaz.
On paper, this might have looked like a 3-3-4 configuration, but realistically, it translated into a disorderly display with mixed results.
Tracing Back the Origins of This Tactic
The seeds for this strategy were first planted in a home fixture against Fulham in December. A red card for Robertson forced Slot to improvise. Rather than adjusting defensively by subbing in a basic defender, he innovatively used Gravenberch as an improvised center-back. The configuration that started as a 3-4-2 subsequently found its rhythm as a 4-2-3.
Slot’s demands on his midfielders paid dividends that day, especially through Dominik Szoboszlai’s dynamic effort in what was ultimately a 2-2 draw, salvaged late on by an 86th-minute equalizer from Diogo Jota.
Despite being hailed as a Slot masterstroke at the time, this chaotic approach, seen in newer matches, is perceived as more calculated disorder rather than tactical genius.
Slot’s strategy in these situations resembles the frantic endgame scenario of sending the goalkeeper forward during the dying moments for a corner, reminiscent of Alisson’s memorable goal against West Brom years back. However, this particular shift in structure often allows opponents to capitalize, exploiting the holes left by Liverpool’s hasty reconfiguration.
Fulham, a team not to be underestimated, managed to leverage this disorder, undermining Liverpool with a strategy that barely required notable adjustment from Marco Silva.
More Attackers, Less Command
Slot’s reconfiguration, incorporating a three-man backline involving Gravenberch and Van Dijk, unfortunately, nullified the attacking spark Conor Bradley initially introduced upon his mid-second-half entry.
Bradley, who had set up Luis Diaz for a goal that trimmed Fulham’s lead, was relegated to juggling roles—center-back, right-back, and midfielder—simultaneously. Meanwhile, removing Robertson for Federico Chiesa may have expanded the attacking line, but it simultaneously squelched Liverpool’s left-flank push just when Robertson was proving to be a genuine offensive threat.
In the Carabao Cup final’s closure against Newcastle, we even saw Virgil van Dijk positioned upfront, with Curtis Jones taking a covering defender role.
Essentially, adding extra attackers often resulted in congestion, stepping on each other’s toes rather than enhancing gameplay.
Though examined through a lens of disappointment following these outcomes, and had Liverpool salvaged a draw or win, our perceptions might be different. However, it is hard to avoid the sense of desperation enveloping this aggressive setup approach.
After enduring a third dispiriting result in the recent quartet of games, it seems evident that attackers like Chiesa and Harvey Elliott deserve more faith in Slot’s 4-3-3 setup from the start.
